As the previous chapter discussed the details of American dual containment policy, we are now in a position to examine the role of the perceptions that underpinned it. Specifically, it argues that Iran was perceived as a threat to American interests thanks to the legacy of mistrust between the two states, which dates back to 1979 and was exacerbated by the American commitment to Israeli security and the Arab-Israeli peace process. In contrast, Iraq under Saddam Hussein was seen as a threat to American interests, thanks to the aggressive wars it waged in the previous decade. Perceptions of American power in the wake of the Cold War also played an important role, given the absence of superpower competition.
This chapter focuses primarily on Iran because it is a more complex case than that of Iraq. In addition to examining the poisonous political legacy of the 1980 hostage crisis, it also examines the debate in the United States about the threat posed by "radical Islam" in the wake of the Cold War (given the claims at the time about the links between Iran, radical Islamic forces, and terrorism), and the impact of the Arab-Israeli peace process in the 1990s on the perceptions of US policymakers.
Perceptions of Power and Opportunity
Perceptions of relative power play a significant role in the formation of foreign policy, and "dual containment" proved to be no exception to this rule. American policymakers stated at several points throughout the 1990s that the end of the Cold War and its superpower rivalry gave the United States more latitude to pursue its objectives and that the reconfiguration of global power structures resulting from the end of the Cold War required a new approach to international relations that recognized this fact.
Writing before he entered office as a member of the Clinton administration, Martin Indyk summed up his view of the US position in the Middle East by saying, "The end of the Cold War and the results of the Gulf War have not only anointed the US as the sole superpower, but have also left it the dominant power in the Middle East and the custodian of the region's balance of power." 6 In the same article Indyk called to the United States to use its power in the new unipolar era to "begin the transformation of the Middle East from a balance of power system to one based more on notions of collective security" rather than simply attempting to contain hostile states and bolster friendly ones. 7 As part of this agenda, Indyk called for the removal of Saddam Hussein, the control of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), and political reform in friendly Arab states as well as a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
